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Abstract—We propose Bayesian differential privacy, a re-
laxation of differential privacy that provides sharper privacy
guarantees for similarly distributed data, especially in difficult
scenarios, such as deep learning. We derive a general privacy ac-
counting method for iterative learning algorithms under Bayesian
differential privacy and show that it is a generalisation of the
well-known moments accountant. Our experiments demonstrate
significant improvement in privacy guarantees for typical deep
learning datasets, such as MNIST and CIFAR-10, in some cases
bringing the privacy budget ε from 8 down to 0.5. Additionally,
we demonstrate applicability of Bayesian differential privacy to
variational inference and achieve the state-of-the-art privacy-
accuracy trade-off.
Index Terms—Machine learning, differential privacy, artificial
neural networks, variational inference
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in machine learning (ML) present countless op-
portunities for companies, governments and individuals to
benefit from the collected data. At the same time, the ability
of ML models to capture fine levels of detail potentially
compromises privacy of data providers. Recent studies [1, 2, 3]
suggest that even in a black-box setting it is possible to detect
the presence of individual records in the training set or recover
certain features of these records.
A number of solutions has been proposed to tackle this prob-
lem. They vary in how privacy is achieved and to what extent
data is protected. In this work, we consider a notion that is
viewed by many researchers as the gold standard—differential
privacy (DP) [4]. Initially, DP algorithms focused on sanitising
simple statistics, such as mean, median, etc., using a technique
known as output perturbation. In recent years, the field made a
lot of progress towards the goal of privacy-preserving machine
learning, through works on objective perturbation [5], stochas-
tic gradient descent with DP updates [6], to more complex and
practical techniques [7, 8, 9, 10].
However, despite significant advances, differentially private
machine learning still suffers from two major problems: (a)
utility loss due to excessive amounts of noise added during
training and (b) difficulty in interpreting the privacy parameters
ε and δ. In many cases where the first problem appears to be
solved, it is actually being hidden by the second problem. To
illustrate it, we design a motivational example in Section III-C
that shows how a seemingly strong privacy guarantee turns
out to allow for the attacker accuracy to be as high as 99%.
Even considering that this guarantee is very pessimistic and
holds against a very powerful adversary with any auxiliary
information, it can hardly be viewed as a reassurance to a user.
Moreover, it provides only the worst-case bound, leaving users
to wonder how far is the worst-case from a typical case.
In this paper, we focus on practicality of a privacy guarantee
and propose a relaxation of differential privacy that provides
more meaningful guarantees for typical scenarios on top of
the global differential privacy guarantee. We name it Bayesian
differential privacy (BDP).
The key to our relaxation is our definition of typical
scenarios. At the core of it lies the observation that machine
learning models are designed and tuned for a particular data
distribution (for example, an MRI dataset is very unlikely to
contain a picture of a car). Moreover, such prior distribution
of data is often already available to the attacker. We consider a
scenario typical when all sensitive data is drawn from the same
distribution. While the traditional differential privacy treats all
data as equally likely and hides differences by large amounts
of noise, Bayesian differential privacy calibrates noise to the
data distribution. Thus, for any two datasets drawn from the
same distribution, and given the same privacy mechanism with
the same amount of noise, BDP guarantees are tighter than DP
guarantees. It is important to note that this data distribution
can be unknown, and the necessary statistics can be estimated
from data as shown in the following sections.
To accompany the notion of Bayesian differential privacy
(Section IV-A), we provide its theoretical analysis and the
privacy accounting framework (Section IV-B). The latter con-
siders the privacy loss random variable and employs principled
tools from probability theory to find concentration bounds
on it. It provides a clean derivation of privacy accounting in
general (Sections IV-B and IV-C), as well as in the special
case of subsampled Gaussian noise mechanism (Section IV-D).
Moreover, we show that it is a generalisation of the well-
known moments accountant (MA) [7] (Section IV-E1).
Since our privacy accounting relies on data distribution
samples, a natural concern would be that the data not present
in the dataset are not taken into account, and thus, are not
protected. However, this is not the case, because our finite
sample estimator is specifically designed to address this issue
(see Section IV-C).
Our contributions in this paper are the following:
• we propose a relaxation of DP, called Bayesian differen-
tial privacy, that allows to provide more practical privacy
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guarantees in a wide range of scenarios;
• we derive a clean, principled method for privacy account-
ing in learning that generalises the moments accountant;
• we experimentally demonstrate advantages of our method
(Section V), including the state-of-the-art privacy bounds
in deep learning applications (Section V-B) and varia-
tional inference (Section V-C), a popular class of algo-
rithms rarely considered in privacy research.
II. RELATED WORK
As machine learning applications become more and more
common, various vulnerabilities and attacks on ML models get
discovered, based on both passive (for example, model inver-
sion [1] and membership inference [2]) and active adversaries
(e.g. [3]), raising the need for developing matching defences.
Differential privacy [4, 11] is one of the strongest privacy
standards that can be employed to protect ML models from
these and other attacks. Since pure ε-DP is hard to achieve
in many realistic learning settings, a notion of approximate
(ε, δ)-DP is used across-the-board in machine learning. It is
often achieved as a result of applying the Gaussian noise
mechanism [12]. Several alternative notions and relaxations of
DP have also been proposed, such as computational DP [13],
mutual-information privacy [14, 15], different versions of con-
centrated DP (CDP [16], zCDP [17], tCDP [18]), and Re´nyi
DP (RDP) [19]. Some other relaxations [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] tip
the balance even further in favour of applicability at the cost of
weaker guarantees, considering the average-case instead of the
worst-case or limiting the guarantee to a given dataset. Unlike
these relaxations, our notion is not limited to a particular
dataset, but rather a particular distribution of data (e.g. emails,
MRI images, etc.), which is a much weaker assumption.
For a long time, approximate DP remained unachievable
in more popular deep learning scenarios. Some earlier at-
tempts [25] led to prohibitively high bounds on ε [7, 8] that
were later shown to be ineffective against attacks [3]. A major
step in the direction of bringing privacy loss values down
to more practical magnitudes was done by Abadi et al. [7]
with the introduction of the moments accountant, currently a
state-of-the-art method for keeping track of the privacy loss
during training. Followed by improvements in differentially
private training techniques [8, 9], it allowed to achieve single-
digit DP guarantees (ε < 10) for classic supervised learning
benchmarks, such as MNIST, SVHN, and CIFAR.
In general, an important aspect of a privacy notion is
composability, accountability, and interpretability. Apart from
sharp bounds, the moments accountant is attractive because
it operates within the classic notion of (ε, δ)-DP. Some of
the alternative notions of DP, such as [19, 18], also provide
tight composition theorems, along with some other advantages,
but to the best of our knowledge, they are not broadly used
in practice compared to traditional DP (although there are
some examples [26]). One of the possible reasons for that is
interpretability: parameters of (α, ε)-RDP or (µ, τ)-CDP are
hard to interpret. While it may be difficult to quantify the
actual guarantee provided by specific values of ε, δ of the
traditional DP, it is still advantageous that they have a clearer
probabilistic interpretation.
Our privacy notion can be related to some of the past work
on DP relaxations. In Section IV-E1, we discuss its connection
to RDP [19] and the moments accountant [7]. Similarly, there
is a link to concentrated DP definitions.
A number of previous relaxations considered a similar idea
of limiting the scope of protected data or using the data
generating distribution, either through imposing a set of data
evolution scenarios [27], policies [28], distributions [29, 30],
or families of distributions [31, 32]. Some of these definitions
(e.g. [29]) may require more noise, because they are stronger
than DP in the sense that datasets can differ in more than one
data point. This is not the case with our definition: like DP,
it considers adjacent datasets differing in a single data point.
The major problem of such definitions, however, is that in
real-world scenarios it is not feasible to define distributions
or families of distributions that generate data. And even if
this problem is solved by restricting the query functions to
enable the usage of the central limit theorem (e.g. [30, 33]),
these guarantees would only hold asymptotically and may
require prohibitively large batch sizes. While Bayesian dif-
ferential privacy can be seen as a special case of some of
the above definitions, the crucial difference and the primary
reason it is defined this way, comes with Bayesian accounting
(Sections IV-B, IV-C), which only requires a finite number
of samples from these data distributions, and hence, allows a
broad range of real-world applications.
Finally, there are other approaches that use the data distri-
bution information in one way or another, and coincidentally
share the same [34] or similar [35] names. Yet, similarly to the
methods discussed above, their assumptions (e.g. the bound on
the minimum probability of a datapoint) and implementation
requirements (e.g. potentially constructing correlation matrices
for millions of data samples) make practical applications dif-
ficult. Perhaps the most similar to our approach is the random
differential privacy [36], however, the authors only propose
a basic composition theorem, which is not tight enough, and
computing the probabilities over all dataset examples would
not be practical in many realistic machine learning scenarios.
We evaluate our method on two popular classes of learning
algorithms: deep neural networks and variational inference
(VI). Privacy-preserving deep learning is being extensively
studied, and is frequently used in combination with moments
accountant [7, 8, 9], which makes it a perfect setting for
comparison. Bayesian inference methods, on the other hand,
have received less attention from the private learning commu-
nity. There are, nonetheless, very interesting results suggesting
one could obtain DP guarantees ”for free” (without adding
noise) in some methods like posterior sampling [37, 38] and
stochastic gradient Monte Carlo [39]. A differentially private
version of variational inference, obtained by applying noise
to the gradients and using moments accountant, has also been
proposed [40]. We show that with our accountant it is possible
to build VI that is both highly accurate and differentially
private by sampling from a variational distribution.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide necessary definitions, back-
ground and notation used in the paper. We also describe a
general setting of the problem.
A. Definitions and notation
We use D,D′ to represent neighbouring (adjacent) datasets.
Unless otherwise specified, these datasets differ in a single
example x′ (i.e. either D′ = D ∪ {x′} or D = D′ ∪ {x′}).
Private learning outcomes (model parameters, neural network
weights, etc., after applying privacy mechanism) are denoted
by w. Whenever ambiguous, we denote expectation over data
as Ex, and over the privacy mechanism randomness as Ew.
Definition 1. A randomised function (algorithm) A : D → R
with domain D and rangeR satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy
if for any two adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ D and for any set of
outcomes S ⊂ R the following holds:
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
Definition 2. The privacy loss LA of a randomised algorithm
A : D → R for outcome w ∈ R and datasets D,D′ ∈ D is
given by:
LA(w,D,D′) = log
Pr [A(D) = w]
Pr [A(D′) = w] .
For continuous outcome distributions, which is our primary
focus, the above statement is a slight abuse notation: what we
actually mean in this case is the ratio of probability density
functions pA(w|D) and pA(w|D′). For notational simplicity,
we often omit the designation A (i.e. we use p(w|D)) and
other arguments (i.e. L instead of LA(w,D,D′)) when it
can be inferred from context. Also, note that the privacy loss
random variable L is distributed by drawing w ∼ p(w|D)
(see Dwork and Rothblum [16, Section 2.1 and Definition
3.1]), which helps linking it to well-known divergences.
Definition 3. The Gaussian noise mechanism achieving (ε, δ)-
DP, for a function f : D → Rm, is defined as
A(D) = f(D) +N (0, σ2),
where σ > C
√
2 log 1.25δ /ε and C = maxD,D′ ‖f(D) −
f(D′)‖ is the L2-sensitivity of f .
For more details on differential privacy and the Gaussian
mechanism, we refer the reader to [12].
We will also need the definition of Re´nyi divergence:
Definition 4. Re´nyi divergence of order λ between distribu-
tions P and Q, denoted as Dλ(P‖Q) is defined as
Dλ(P‖Q) = 1
λ− 1 log
∫
p(x)
[
p(x)
q(x)
]λ−1
dx
=
1
λ− 1 log
∫
q(x)
[
p(x)
q(x)
]λ
dx,
where p(x) and q(x) are corresponding density functions of
P and Q.
Analytic expressions for Re´nyi divergence exist for many
common distributions and can be found in [41]. Van Erven
and Harremos [42] provide a good survey of Re´nyi divergence
properties in general.
B. Setting
We assume a general iterative learning algorithm, such
that each iteration t produces a non-private learning outcome
g(t) (e.g. a gradient over a batch of data). This outcome
gets transformed into a private learning outcome w(t) that is
used as a starting point for the next iteration. The learning
outcome can be made private by applying some privacy noise
mechanism (e.g. a Gaussian noise mechanism) or by drawing
it from a distribution. In both cases, we say it comes from
p(w(t)|w(t−1), D) (here we assume the Markov property of
the learning process for brevity of notation, but it is not
necessary in general). The process can run on subsamples
of data, in which case w(t) comes from the distribution
p(w(t)|w(t−1), B(t)), where B(t) is a batch of data used for
parameters update at iteration t, and privacy is amplified
through sampling [43]. For each iteration, we would like
to compute a quantity ct (we call it a privacy cost) that
accumulates over the learning process and allows to compute
privacy loss bounds ε, δ using concentration inequalities.
The overall privacy accounting workflow does not signifi-
cantly differ from prior work, but is in fact a generalisation of
the well-known moments accountant [7]. Importantly, it is not
tied to a specific algorithm or a class of algorithms, as long
as one can map it to the above setting.
C. Motivation
Before we proceed, we find it important to motivate the re-
search on alternative definitions of privacy. The primary reason
for this is that the complexity of the concept of differential
privacy often leads to misunderstanding or overestimation of
the guarantees it provides.
Consider the state-of-the-art differentially private machine
learning models [7, 9]. In order to come close to the non-
private accuracy (say within 10% of it), all of the reported
models stretch their privacy budget to ε > 2 (for a reasonably
low δ), while in many cases it goes up to ε > 5. In real-world
applications, it can even be larger than 101. These numbers
seem small, and thus, may often be overlooked. But let us
present an alternative interpretation.
What we are interested in is the change in the posterior
distribution of the attacker after they see the private model
compared to prior [19, 44]. Let us consider the stronger, pure
DP for simplicity. According to the definition of ε-DP:
p(D|w)
p(D′|w) ≤ e
ε p(D)
p(D′)
.
Assume the following specific example. The datasets D,D′
consist of income values for residents of a small town. There
is one individual x′ whose income is orders of magnitude
higher than the rest, and whose residency in the town is what
1https://www.wired.com/story/apple-differential-privacy-shortcomings/
the attacker wishes to infer. The attacker observes the mean
income w sanitised by a differentially private mechanism with
ε = ε0. It is easy to see, that if the individual is not present
in the dataset, the probability of w being above a certain
threshold is extremely small. On the contrary, if x′ is present,
this probability is higher (say it is equal to r). The attacker
takes a Bayesian approach, computes the likelihood of the
observed value under each of the two assumptions and the
corresponding posteriors given a flat prior. The attacker then
concludes that the individual is present in the dataset and is a
resident.
By the above expression, r can only be eε0 times larger
than the corresponding probability without x′. However, if
the re−ε0 is small enough, then the probability P (A) of
the attacker’s guess being correct is as high as r
r+re−ε0 or,
equivalently,
P (A) =
1
1 + e−ε
. (1)
To put it in perspective, for a DP algorithm with ε = 2, the
upper bound on the accuracy of this attack is as high as 88%.
For ε = 5, it is 99.33%. For ε = 10, 99.995%. Remember that
we used an uninformative flat prior, and for a more informed
attacker these numbers could be even larger.
Such a guarantee is hardly better than no guarantee at all,
because in a more realistic scenario, even without any privacy
protection, this high accuracy is not likely to be achieved by
the attacker. Considering the generality of the DP formulation,
it is not surprising, and to obtain more meaningful guarantees
one needs more stringent assumptions. On the other hand, it
is beneficial to maintain a looser general guarantee in case
assumptions do not hold.
In the next section, we present a relaxation of DP that
uses the same privacy mechanism and augments (instead of
replacing) the general DP guarantee with a tighter guarantee
for the most cases. In the view of our example: while it is
hard to hide the presence of a wealthy individual, the privacy
guarantee for the rest of the town residents is likely to be
significantly stronger.
IV. BAYESIAN DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we define Bayesian differential privacy
(BDP). We then state its properties analogous to the classic
DP, derive a practical privacy loss accounting method, and
discuss its relation to the moments accountant.
A. Definition
We start with the definition of Bayesian differential pri-
vacy (Definition 5), which implies weak Bayesian differential
privacy (Definition 6), as seen in Appendix A. The first
definition provides a better intuition, connection to concen-
tration inequalities, and is being used for privacy accounting.
Unfortunately, it may not be closed under post-processing, and
therefore, the actual guarantee provided by BDP is stated in
Definition 6 and resembles that of approximate differential pri-
vacy (compare to Definition 1). A similar separation between
the accounting definition and provided guarantees is done in
the moments accountant [7].
Definition 5 (Bayesian Differential Privacy). A randomised
function (algorithm) A : D → R with domain D, range R,
and outcome w = A(D) satisfies (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differ-
ential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ D,
differing in a single data point x′ ∼ µ(x), the following holds:
Pr[LA(w,D,D′) ≥ εµ] ≤ δµ, (2)
where probability is taken over the randomness of the outcome
w and the additional example x′.
We use the subscript µ to underline the main difference
between the classic DP and Bayesian DP: in the classic
definition the probability is taken only over the randomness
of the outcome (w), while the BDP definition contains two
random variables (w and x′). Therefore, the privacy parameters
ε and δ depend on the data distribution µ(x).
The addition of another random variable yields the change
in the meaning of δµ compared to the δ of DP. In Bayesian
differential privacy, it also accounts for the privacy mechanism
failures in the tails of data distributions in addition to the tails
of outcome distributions.
Definition 6 (Weak Bayesian Differential Privacy). A ran-
domised function (algorithm) A : D → R with domain D and
range R satisfies (εµ, δµ)-weak Bayesian differential privacy
if for any two adjacent datasets D,D′ ∈ D, differing in a
single data point x′ ∼ µ(x), and for any set of outcomes S
the following holds:
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεµ Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δµ. (3)
Proposition 1. (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differential privacy implies
(εµ, δµ)-weak Bayesian differential privacy.
Let us also formulate some basic properties of Bayesian DP
that mirror the properties of the classic DP. The proofs of these
properties, as well as the above proposition, can be found in
Appendix A.
Proposition 2 (Post-processing). Let A : D → R be a
(εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differentially private algorithm. Then for
any arbitrary randomised data-independent mapping f : R →
R′, f(A(D)) is (εµ, δµ)-weak Bayesian differentially private.
Proposition 3 (Basic composition). Let Ai : D → Ri, ∀i =
1..k, be a sequence of (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differentially private
algorithms. Then their combination, defined as A1:k : D →
R1 × . . .×Rk, is (kεµ, kδµ)-Bayesian differentially private.
Proposition 4 (Group privacy). Let A : D → R be a (εµ, δµ)-
Bayesian differentially private algorithm. Then for all pairs of
datasets D,D′ ∈ D, differing in k data points x1, . . . , xk
s.t. xi ∼ µ(x) for i = 1..k, A(D) is (kεµ, kδµ)-Bayesian
differentially private.
In the remainder of the paper, whenever the dependency on
µ(x) can be inferred from context, we omit the subscript µ.
Remark. While Definition 5 does not specify the distribution
of any point in the dataset other than the additional example x′,
it is natural and convenient to assume that all examples in the
dataset are drawn from the same distribution µ(x). This holds
in many real-world applications, including all applications
evaluated in this paper, and it allows using samples from the
dataset instead of requiring knowing the true distribution.
Remark. We also assume that all data points are exchange-
able [45], i.e. any permutation of data points has the same
joint probability. It enables tighter accounting for iterative
applications of the privacy mechanism (see Section IV-B), and
is naturally satisfied in the considered scenarios.
B. Privacy Accounting
In the context of learning, it is important to be able to
keep track of the privacy loss over iterative applications of
the privacy mechanism. And since the bounds provided by the
basic composition theorem are loose, we derive the advanced
composition theorem and develop a general accounting method
for Bayesian differential privacy, the Bayesian accountant, that
provides a tight bound on privacy loss and is straightforward to
implement. We draw inspiration from the moments accountant.
In Section IV-E1, we show that it is actually a generalisation
of the moments accountant.
Observe that Eq. 2 is a typical concentration bound in-
equality, which are well studied in probability theory. One
of the most common examples of such bounds is Markov’s
inequality. In its extended form, it states the following:
Pr[|L| ≥ ε] ≤ E[ϕ(|L|)]
ϕ(ε)
, (4)
where ϕ(·) is a monotonically increasing non-negative func-
tion. It is immediately evident that it provides a relation
between ε and δ (i.e. δ = E[ϕ(|L|)]/ϕ(ε)), and in order
to determine them we need to choose ϕ and compute the
expectation E[ϕ(|L(w,D,D′)|)]. Note that L(w,D,D′) =
−L(w,D′, D), and since the inequality has to hold for any
pair of D,D′, we can use L instead of |L|.
We use the Chernoff bound that can be obtained by choosing
ϕ(L) = eλL. It is widely known because of its tightness, and
although not explicitly stated, it is also used by Abadi et al.
[7]. The inequality in this case transforms to
Pr[L ≥ ε] ≤ E[e
λL]
eλε
. (5)
This inequality requires the knowledge of the moment
generating function of L or some bound on it. The choice
of the parameter λ can be arbitrary, because the bound holds
for any value of it, but it determines how tight the bound is.
By simple manipulations we obtain
E[eλL] = E
[
e
λ log
p(w|D)
p(w|D′)
]
= E
[(
p(w|D)
p(w|D′)
)λ]
. (6)
If the expectation is taken only over the outcome random-
ness, this expression is the function of Re´nyi divergence (see
Definiton 4) between p(w|D) and p(w|D′), and following this
path yields re-derivation of Re´nyi differential privacy [19].
However, by also taking the expectation over additional ex-
amples x′ ∼ µ(x), we can further tighten this bound.
By the law of total expectation,
E
[(
p(w|D)
p(w|D′)
)λ]
= Ex
[
Ew
[(
p(w|D)
p(w|D′)
)λ∣∣∣∣∣x′
]]
, (7)
where the inner expectation is again the function of Re´nyi
divergence, and the outer expectation is over µ(x).
Combining Eq. 6 and 7 and plugging it in Eq. 5, we get
Pr[L ≥ ε] ≤ Ex
[
eλDλ+1[p(w|D)‖p(w|D
′)]−λε
]
. (8)
This expression determines how to compute ε for a fixed δ
(or vice versa) for one invocation of the privacy mechanism.
However, to accommodate the iterative nature of learning, we
need to deal with the composition of multiple applications
of the mechanism. We already determined that our privacy
notion is naively composable, but in order to achieve better
bounds we need a tighter composition theorem. Note also
that due to computing expectation over data in Eq. 7 and
Eq. 8, we assume exchangeability [45] to obtain results more
efficiently in practice. This assumption is much weaker than
independence and is natural in many applications.
Theorem 1 (Advanced Composition). Let a learning algo-
rithm run for T iterations. Denote by w(1) . . . w(T ) a sequence
of private learning outcomes obtained at iterations 1, . . . , T ,
and L(1:T ) the corresponding total privacy loss. Then,
E
[
eλL
(1:T )
]
=
T∏
t=1
Ex
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
,
where pt = p(w(t)|w(t−1), D), qt = p(w(t)|w(t−1), D′).
Proof. See Appendix B.
We denote the logarithm of the quantity inside the product in
Theorem 1 as ct(λ) and call it the privacy cost of the iteration
t:
ct(λ) = logEx
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
(9)
The privacy cost of the whole learning process is then a
sum of the costs of each iteration. We can now relate ε and δ
parameters of BDP through the privacy cost.
Theorem 2. Let the algorithm produce a sequence of private
learning outcomes w(1) . . . w(T ) using a known probability
distribution p(w(t)|w(t−1), D). Then, for a fixed ε
log δ ≤
T∑
t=1
ct(λ)− λε.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions above, for a fixed δ:
ε ≤ 1
λ
T∑
t=1
ct(λ)− 1
λ
log δ.
Theorems 1, 2 and Corollary 1 immediately provide us with
an efficient privacy accounting algorithm. During training, we
compute the privacy cost ct(λ) for each iteration t, accumulate
it, and then use to compute ε, δ pair. This process is ideologi-
cally close to that of the moment accountant, but accumulates
a different quantity (note the change from the privacy loss
random variable to Re´nyi divergence). We further explore this
connection in Section IV-E1.
The link to Re´nyi divergence is a great advantage for appli-
cability of this framework: as long as the outcome distribution
p(w|D) has a known expression for Re´nyi divergence, it can
be used within a privacy mechanism, and our accountant can
track its privacy loss. Analytic expressions for Re´nyi diver-
gence of many common distributions can be found in [41, 42].
Remark (Optimal choice of λ). Chernoff inequality holds for
any parameter λ > 0, and thus, to get the optimal estimates
of ε, δ one should minimise the right-hand side in Theorem 2
w.r.t. λ. While Abadi et al. [7] suggest computing moments
for λ ≤ 32, we observe that since the moment generating
function is log-convex it is possible to find an optimal value of
λ that minimises the total bound. For some distributions, e.g.
Gaussian without subsampling, it can be found analytically by
computing the derivative and setting it to 0. Unfortunately, for
a more interesting case of subsampled privacy mechanisms,
this is less straightforward. Section V-A3 provides some more
details on how ε depends on the choice of λ.
C. Privacy Cost Estimator
Computing ct(λ) precisely requires access to the data dis-
tribution µ(x), which is unrealistic. Therefore, we need an
estimator for E[eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)].
Typically, having access to the distribution samples, one
would use the law of large numbers and approximate the
expectation with the sample mean. This estimator is unbiased
and converges with the growing number of samples. However,
these are not the properties we are looking for. The most
important property of the estimator in our context is that it
does not underestimate E[eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)], because the bound
(Eq. 5) would not hold for this estimate otherwise.
To solve this, we employ the Bayesian view of the parameter
estimation problem [46] and design an estimator with the
single property: given a fixed probability γ, it returns the value
that overestimates the true expectation with probability 1− γ.
We then incorporate the estimator uncertainty γ in δ.
1) Binary Case: Let us demonstrate the process of con-
structing the expectation estimator with the aforementioned
property on a simple binary example. This technique is based
on [46] and it translates directly to other classes of distri-
butions with minor adjustments. We also address a natural
concern about taking into account the data not present in the
dataset by providing a specific example.
Let the data {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, such that xi ∈ {0, 1}, have
a common mean and a common variance. As this information
is insufficient to solve our problem, let us also assume that
the data comes from the maximum entropy distribution. This
assumption adds the minimum amount of information to the
problem and makes our estimate pessimistic.
For the binary data with the common mean ρ, the maximum
entropy distribution is the Bernoulli distribution:
f(xi|ρ) = ρxi(1− ρ)1−xi , (10)
where ρ is also the probability of success (xi = 1). Then, for
the entire dataset:
f(x1, . . . , xN |ρ) = ρN1(1− ρ)N0 , (11)
where N1 is the number of ones, and N0 is the number of
zeros in the dataset.
We impose the flat prior on ρ, assuming all values in [0, 1]
are equally likely, and use Bayes’ theorem to determine the
distribution of ρ given the data:
f(ρ|x1, . . . , xN ) = Γ(N0 +N1 + 2)
Γ(N0 + 1)Γ(N1 + 1)
ρN1(1− ρ)N0 ,
(12)
where the normalisation constant in front is obtained by setting
the integral over ρ equal to 1.
Now, we can use the above distribution of ρ to design an
estimator ρˆ, such that it overestimates ρ with high probability,
i.e. Pr [ρ ≤ ρˆ] ≥ 1−γ. Namely, ρˆ = F−1(1−γ), where F−1
is the inverse of the CDF:
F−1(1− γ) = inf{z ∈ R :
∫ z
−∞
f(t|x1, . . . , xN )dt ≥ 1− γ}.
We refer to γ as the estimator failure probability, and to 1−γ
as the estimator confidence.
To demonstrate the resilience of this estimator to unseen
data, consider the following simple example. Let the true
expectation be 0.01, and let the data consist of 100 zeros,
and no ones. A typical ”frequentist” mean estimator would
confidently output 0. However, our estimator would never
output 0, unless the confidence is set to 0. When the confidence
is set to 1 (γ = 0), the output is 1, which is the most
pessimistic estimate. Finally, the output ρˆ = ρ = 0.01 will
be assigned the failure probability γ = 0.99101 ≈ 0.36, which
is the probability of not drawing a single 1 in 101 draws.
In a real-world system, the confidence would be set to a
much higher level (in our experiments, we use γ = 10−15),
and the probability of 1 would be significantly overestimated.
Thus, unseen data do not present a problem for this estimator,
because it exaggerates the probability of data that increase the
estimated expectation.
2) Continuous Case: For applications evaluated in this pa-
per, we are primarily concerned with continuous distributions.
Thus, let us define the following m-sample estimator of ct(λ)
for continuous distributions with existing mean and variance:
cˆt(λ) = log
[
M(t) +
F−1(1− γ,m− 1)√
m− 1 S(t)
]
, (13)
where
M(t) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
eλDˆ
(t)
λ+1 ,
S(t) =
√√√√ 1
m
m∑
i=1
e2λDˆ
(t)
λ+1 −M(t)2,
Dˆ(t)λ+1 = max {Dλ+1(pˆt‖qˆt), Dλ+1(qˆt‖pˆt)} ,
pˆt = p(w
(t) | w(t−1), B(t)),
qˆt = p(w
(t) | w(t−1), B(t) \ {xi}),
and F−1(1 − γ,m − 1) is the inverse of the Student’s t-
distribution CDF at 1 − γ with m − 1 degrees of freedom.
Since in many cases learning is performed on mini-batches,
we can compute Re´nyi divergence in a similar way, on batches
B(t).
Theorem 3. Estimator cˆt(λ) overestimates ct(λ) with proba-
bility 1− γ. That is,
Pr [cˆt(λ) < ct(λ)] ≤ γ.
Proof. The proof is similar to the above binary example. See
more details in Appendix C.
Remark. By adapting the maximum entropy probability dis-
tribution an equivalent estimator can be derived for other
classes of distributions (e.g. discrete).
To avoid introducing new parameters in the privacy defini-
tion, we can incorporate the probability γ of underestimating
the true expectation in δ. We can re-write:
Pr[LA(w(t), D,D′) ≥ ε]
= Pr
[
LA(w(t), D,D′) ≥ ε, cˆt(λ) ≥ ct(λ)
]
+ Pr
[
LA(w(t), D,D′) ≥ ε, cˆt(λ) < ct(λ)
]
.
When cˆt(λ) ≥ ct(λ), using the Chernoff inequality, the
first summand is bounded by β = exp(
∑T
t=1 cˆt(λ) − λε).
Whenever cˆt(λ) < ct(λ),
Pr[LA(w(t), D,D′) ≥ ε, cˆt(λ) < ct(λ)]
≤ Pr[cˆt(λ) < ct(λ)]
≤ γ.
Therefore, the true δµ is bounded from above by δ = β+γ,
and despite the incomplete data, we can claim that the mech-
anism is (ε, δ)-Bayesian differentially private.
Remark. This step further changes the interpretation of δ
in Bayesian differential privacy compared to the classic DP.
Apart from the probability of the privacy loss exceeding ε,
e.g. in the tails of its distribution, it also incorporates our
uncertainty about the true data distribution (in other words,
the probability of underestimating the true expectation because
of not observing enough data samples). It can be intuitively
understood as accounting for unobserved (but feasible) data in
δ, rather than in ε.
D. Gaussian Mechanism
In this section, we consider the subsampled Gaussian noise
mechanism [12], the primary mechanism used in privacy-
preserving machine learning. It differs from the original mech-
anism by the fact that it is applied on batches of data sampled
with some probability rather than the whole dataset. In this
case, privacy is amplified by sampling [7].
The outcome distribution p(w(t) | w(t−1), D′) in this
case is equivalent to the mixture of two Gaussians
p(w(t) | w(t−1), D′) = (1− q)N (gt, σ2) + qN (g′t, σ2), where
gt and g′t are non-private outcomes at the iteration t computed
on a batch without x′ and with x′ correspondingly, σ is the
noise parameter of the mechanism, and q is the data sampling
probability.
Plugging the outcome distribution into the formula for Re´nyi
divergence, we get the following result for the privacy cost.
Theorem 4. Given the Gaussian noise mechanism with the
noise parameter σ and subsampling probability q, the privacy
cost for λ ∈ N at iteration t can be expressed as
ct(λ) = max{cLt (λ), cRt (λ)},
where
cLt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ+1,q)
[
e
k2−k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
,
cRt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ,q)
[
e
k2+k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
,
and B(λ, q) is the binomial distribution with λ experiments
and the probability of success q.
Proof. See Appendix D.
E. Discussion
1) Relation to Moments Accountant and RDP: As men-
tioned in Section IV-B, removing the distribution requirement
on datasets D,D′ and further simplifying Eq. 8, we can
recover the relation between Re´nyi differential privacy and
(ε, δ)-DP.
At the same time, our accounting technique closely resem-
bles the moments accountant. In fact, we can show that the
moments accountant is a special case of Theorem 4. Indeed,
ignoring the data distribution information and substituting
expectation by maxD,D′ yields the substitution of ‖gt − g′t‖
for C in Theorem 4, where C is the sensitivity (or clipping
threshold), which turns out to be the exact moments accountant
bound. In addition, there are some extra benefits, such as
avoiding numerical integration when using λ ∈ N due to
connection to Binomial distribution. It improves numerical sta-
bility and computational efficiency compared to the moments
accountant.
2) Sensitivity: One may notice that throughout the paper,
apart from Definition 3, we did not mention an important
concept of differential privacy—sensitivity. Indeed, bounded
sensitivity is not as essential for Bayesian differential privacy,
because extreme individual contributions are mitigated by their
low probability. However, in practice it is still advantageous
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Fig. 1: Dependency between σ and ε for different C when clipping for both DP and BDP.
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Fig. 2: Dependency between σ and ε for different C when clipping for DP and not clipping for BDP.
to restrict sensitivity in order to have a better control of
the accumulated privacy loss and avoid unwanted spikes. We
investigate this aspect in Section V-A1. Moreover, bounding
sensitivity ensures that the privacy mechanism is also differ-
entially private and provides guarantees for data for which the
additional assumptions do not hold.
3) Privacy of cˆt(λ): Due to computing cˆt(λ) from data
our privacy guarantee ε becomes data-dependent and may
theoretically leak sensitive information by itself. There are
multiple ways to approach this problem.
One way would be to observe that the privacy leakage is
tied to the error of the estimator: an adversary who has access
to the prior data distribution would be able to compute the
true ct(λ) with arbitrary precision, and thus, the only leaking
information about the actual data is the error between cˆt(λ)
and ct(λ). On the other hand, it may be possible to express the
distribution of the sample mean and variance of the privacy
loss through the true mean and bound the density ratios for
two neighbouring datasets.
Another possible solution could be based on computing the
estimator from noisy data, ensuring the same level of privacy
as the trained model. One can also prove that it does not result
in underestimation of the real privacy cost. However, based
on our preliminary experiments, this approach requires more
investigation of its practicality because the obtained bounds
are looser.
Finally, one should consider the fact that the information
from many high-dimensional vectors gets first compressed
down to their pairwise distances, which are not as informative
in high-dimensional spaces (i.e. the curse of dimensionality),
and then down to one number. We believe that at this rate
of compression very little knowledge can be gained by an
attacker in practice. In Section V-B, we examine pairwise
gradient distances of the points in the training set and outside,
and do not find any evidence of privacy leakage. However,
obtaining strict theoretical bounds, potentially in one of the
ways discussed above, is more desirable and is an important
future research direction.
V. EVALUATION
This experimental section comprises three parts. First, we
study the behaviour of Bayesian differential privacy and the
Bayesian accountant on synthetic data. More specifically,
we examine the trade-off between the added noise and the
privacy guarantee, and how well mechanisms compose over
multiple steps. We compare these to the state-of-the-art DP
results obtained by the moments accountant [7]. Second,
we consider the context of deep learning. In particular, we
use the differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-
SGD), a well known privacy-preserving learning technique
broadly used in combination with the moments accountant, to
train neural networks on classic image classification datasets
MNIST and CIFAR10. We then compare the accuracy and
privacy guarantees obtained under BDP and under DP. Finally,
we study variational inference, a popular probabilistic method
that is largely overlooked in private learning research, and
adapt our framework to it.
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Fig. 3: Evolution of ε over multiple steps of the Gaussian noise mechanism with σ = C for DP (with clipping) and BDP
(without clipping). Sub-captions indicate the noise variance relative to the gradient norms distribution.
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Fig. 4: Dependency of λ and ε for different clipping thresholds
C, q = 64/60000, σ = 1.0.
In Sections V-A and V-B, we use the Gaussian noise
mechanism with standard deviation 2Cσ. We assume that the
input to the privacy mechanism is a batch of gradients. For
the moments accountant, these gradients are always clipped
to C before adding noise (i.e. the gradients are scaled, such
that their L2 norm does not exceed C). For the Bayesian
accountant, it may be clipped or not, which is always stated
over figures or in the text. Whenever the privacy mechanism
is invoked repeatedly, Theorem 1 is used to compute the
Bayesian ε over multiple learning iterations (steps).
As stated above, DP and BDP can use the same privacy
mechanism and be accounted in parallel to ensure the DP guar-
antees hold if BDP assumptions fail. Thus, all comparisons
in this section should be viewed in the following way: the
reported BDP guarantee would apply to typical data (all data
drawn from the same distribution as the dataset); the reported
DP guarantee would apply to all other data; their difference
is the advantage we gain by using BDP for typical data. In
some experiments we use smaller noise variance for BDP in
order to speed up training, meaning that the reported BDP
guarantees will further improve if noise variance is increased
to DP levels.
TABLE I: Estimated privacy bounds ε for δ = 10−5 for
MNIST, CIFAR10, Abalone and Adult datasets.
Accuracy ε P (A)
Dataset Baseline Private DP BDP DP BDP
MNIST 99% 96% 2.18 0.62 89.84% 65.02%
CIFAR10 86% 73% 8.0 0.51 99.97% 62.48%
Abalone 77% 76% 7.6 0.5 99.95% 62.25%
Adult 81% 81% 0.5 0.16 62.25% 53.99%
A. Behaviour of Bayesian Differential Privacy
Let us start by studying the behaviour of Bayesian differ-
ential privacy with regards to its parameters, as well as in
comparison to classic differential privacy. All experiments in
this section are carried out on synthetic data, but as we show in
the next section these results hold for real data. The synthetic
gradients are drawn from the Weibull distribution with the
shape parameter < 1 to imitate a more difficult case of heavy-
tailed gradient distributions.
1) Effect of σ and bounded sensitivity: The primary goal
of our paper is to obtain more meaningful privacy guarantees
sacrificing as little utility as possible. The main factor in the
loss of utility is the variance of the noise we add during
training. Therefore it is critical to examine how our guarantee
behaves compared to the classic DP for the same amount of
noise. Or equivalently, how much noise does it require to reach
the same ε.
As stated above, there are two possible regimes of operation
for the Gaussian noise mechanism under Bayesian differential
privacy: with bounded sensitivity and with unbounded sensi-
tivity. The first is just like the classic DP: there is a maximum
bound on the contribution of an individual example, and the
noise is scaled to it. The second does not have a bound on
contribution and mitigates it by taking into account the low
probability of extreme contributions.
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the dependency between σ
and ε for different clipping thresholds C chosen relative to
the quantiles of the gradient norm distribution. If we bound
sensitivity by clipping the gradients, it ensures that BDP
always requires less noise than DP to reach the same ε, as
seen in Figure 1. As we decrease the clipping threshold C,
more and more gradients get clipped and the BDP curve
approaches the DP curve (Figure 1a). However, as we observe
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Fig. 5: Evolution of ε for δ = 10−5 over 20 epochs of training
CNN on MNIST dataset.
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in Figure 2 comparing DP with bounded sensitivity and BDP
with unbounded sensitivity, using unclipped gradients results
in less consistent behaviour. It may require a more thorough
search for the right noise variance to reach the same ε.
2) Composition: In this experiment, we study the growth
rate of the privacy loss over a number of invocations of the
mechanism. We do not clip gradients for BDP in order to show
the raw effect of the signal-to-noise ratio on the privacy loss
evolution behaviour.
In Figure 3, we plot ε as a function of steps for different
levels of noise. Naturally, as the noise standard deviation gets
closer to the expected gradients norm, the growth rate of
the privacy loss decreases dramatically. Even when the noise
is at the 0.25-quantile, the Bayesian accountant matches the
moments accountant. It is worth noting, that DP behaves the
same in all these experiments because the gradients get clipped
at the noise level C. Introducing clipping for BDP yields the
behaviour of Figure 3d, as we demonstrate in the next section
on real data.
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3) Effect of λ: As mentioned in Section IV-B, the privacy
cost, and therefore the final value of ε, depend on the choice
of λ. We run the Bayesian accountant for the Gaussian
mechanism with the fixed pairwise gradient distances (s.t.
these results apply exactly to the moments accountant) for
different signal-to-noise ratios and different λ.
Depicted in Figure 4 is ε as a function of λ for 10000 steps.
We observe that λ has a clear effect on the final ε value. In
some cases this effect is very significant and the change is
sharp. It suggests that in practice one should be careful about
the choice of λ. We also note that for lower signal-to-noise
ratios (e.g. C = 0.1, σ = 1) the optimal choice of λ is much
further on the real line and may well be outside the typically
range computed in the literature.
B. Deep Learning
In this section, we consider the application to privacy-
preserving deep learning. Our setting closely mimics that
of [7] to enable a direct comparison with the moments
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Fig. 9: Logistic regression test accuracy vs ε for Abalone data.
accountant and DP. We use a version of DP-SGD [7] that has
been extensively applied to build differentially private machine
learning models, from deep neural networks to Bayesian learn-
ing. The idea of DP-SGD is simple: at every iteration of SGD,
clip the gradient norm to some constant C (ensuring bounded
sensitivity), and then add Gaussian noise with variance C2σ2.
We train a classifier represented by a neural network (un-
like [7], without PCA) on MNIST [47] and on CIFAR10 [48]
using DP-SGD. The first dataset contains 60,000 training
examples and 10,000 testing images. We use large batch sizes
of 1024, clip gradient norms to C = 1, and σ = 0.1. The
second dataset consists of 50,000 training images and 10,000
testing images of objects split in 10 classes. For this dataset,
we use the batch size of 512, C = 1, and σ = 0.7. We fix
δ = 10−5 in all experiments. In case of CIFAR10, in order for
our results to be comparable to [7], we pre-train convolutional
layers of the model on a different dataset and retrain a fully-
connected layer in a privacy-preserving manner.
Let us briefly outline how DP-SGD works in conjunction
with the privacy accountant. The non-private learning outcome
at each iteration t is the gradient gt of the loss function w.r.t.
the model parameters, the outcome distribution is the Gaussian
N (gt, σ2C2). Before adding noise, the norm of the gradients
is clipped to C. For the moments accountant, the privacy loss
is calculated using this C and σ. For the Bayesian accountant,
either pairs of examples xi, xj or pairs of batches are sampled
from the dataset at each iteration, and used to compute cˆt(λ).
Although clipping gradients is no longer necessary with the
Bayesian accountant, as stated in Sections V-A1 and V-A2,
it is highly beneficial for incurring lower privacy loss at
each iteration and obtaining tighter composition. Moreover,
as previously discussed, it ensures the classic DP bounds on
top of BDP bounds.
Figures 5 and 7 demonstrate the evolution of ε bound
over training batches computed on MNIST and CIFAR10
datasets accordingly. The first observation is that Bayesian
differential privacy allows to add far less noise to achieve
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Fig. 10: Logistic regression test accuracy vs ε for Adult data.
comparable ε. Because of this, the models reach the same
test accuracy much faster. For example, our model reaches
96% accuracy within 20 epochs for MNIST, while DP model
requires hundreds of epochs to avoid ε blowing up, like it
is shown in Figures 5 and 7. These results also confirm
our assumption that the actual disagreement between gradient
directions is much smaller than their norms, and therefore,
requires less noise to hide.
Overall, using the information about gradient distribution
allows the BDP models to reach the same accuracy at a much
lower ε. On MNIST, we manage to reduce it from 2.18 to 0.62.
For CIFAR10, from 8.0 to 0.51. See details in Table I. To make
our results more transparent, we include the potential attacker
success probability P (A) from Section III-C computed using
Eq. 1. In this interpretation, the benefits of using Bayesian
differential privacy become even more apparent.
An important aspect of BDP, discussed in Section IV-E3,
is the potential privacy leakage of the privacy cost estimator.
Since at the moment we do not have a rigorous bound on
the amount of information it leaks, we conduct the following
experiment. After training the model (to ensure it contains as
much information about data as possible), we compute the
gradient pairwise distances over train and test sets. We then
plot the histograms of these distances to inspect any divergence
that would distinguish the data that was used in training. Note
that this is more information than what is available to an
adversary, who only observes ε.
As it turns out, these distributions are nearly identical (see
Figures 6 and 8), and we do not observe any correlation with
the fact of the presence of data in the training set. For example,
the sample mean of the test set can be both somewhat higher
or lower than that of the train set. We also run the t-test for
equality of means and Levene’s test for equality of variances,
obtaining p-values well over the 0.05 threshold, suggesting
that the difference of the means and the variances of these
distributions is not statistically significant and the equality
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
C. Variational Inference
While DP-SGD is widely applicable, some machine learning
and statistical inference techniques do not require additional
noise at all. For example, it has been shown that differential
privacy guarantees arise naturally and ”for free” in methods
like sampling from the true posterior [37] and Stochastic
Gradient MCMC [39]. Using Bayesian privacy accounting we
can show that another popular Bayesian approach–variational
inference–also enjoys almost ”free” privacy guarantees.
The goal of variational inference is to approximate a pos-
terior distribution p(w|D) by a member of a known family of
”simple” distributions q(w; θ) parametrised by θ. Most com-
monly, it is done via minimising the reverse KL-divergence
DKL(Q||P ), but there are a lot of modern variations, for
example using χ-divergence [49], Re´nyi divergence [50], or
other variational bounds [51].
As baselines, we use DPVI-MA [40] and DP-SGLD [39].
The first one employs DP-SGD combined with moments
accountant to train a private VI model, while the second is
a stochastic gradient MCMC method achieving DP due to
the noisy nature of SGLD algorithm. Following [40], we
run evaluation on two classification tasks taken from UCI
database: Abalone [52] and Adult [53]. Both are binary clas-
sification tasks: predicting the age of abalone from physical
measurements, and predicting income based on a person’s
attributes. They have 4,177 and 48,842 examples with 8 and
14 attributes accordingly. We use the same pre-processing and
models as [40].
To translate variational inference to the language of our
privacy accountant, q(w; θ) is the outcome distribution, and
we are interested in
Ex
[
eλDλ+1(q(w;θ)||q(w;θ
′))
]
,
where θ, θ′ are variational parameters learnt from D and D′.
At each learning iteration, w(t) are sampled from q(w; θ(t−1)),
updates are computed using the variational bound and data
D (or its subsamples), and parameters are updated to θ(t).
Therefore, for Bayesian accounting, we sample x, x′ and
w from D and q(w; θ(t−1)) and compute cˆt(λ). The exact
expression is slightly different from the one for the Gaussian
noise mechanism derived in Theorem 4 because of non-
identical variances, but the derivation follows the same steps
(see Appendix D).
To enable differential privacy for variational inference meth-
ods, we have to deal with two important restrictions. First,
parameters θ of variational distribution q(w; θ) are not dif-
ferentially private and need to be concealed or made private
by other means. Second, as a result of the previous point,
MAP or MLE estimates based on θ would also reveal private
information. However, samples w ∼ q(w; θ) are differentially
private and can be used to perform the same tasks. We haven’t
observed significant loss of accuracy when using a batch of
samples w instead of true parameters θ, and thus, we consider
it a minor cost. Note also that each sample needs to be
accounted for, both in training and after training. In our tests,
we run logistic regression using an average of up to 10 samples
from variational distribution, significantly less than what is
necessary to recover true variational parameters.
We observe in Figures 9 and 10 that our modified variational
inference with Bayesian accountant achieves consistent advan-
tage over DPVI-MA and DP-SGLD both in terms of accuracy
and privacy accounting. It is the only method reaching non-
DP accuracy on Abalone data and the first to reach it on
Adults data, at a fraction of other methods’ privacy budget. At
any point, the trade-off curve of our technique remains above
others. Moreover, the test variance of our approach (computed
over 10 trials) is considerably smaller, presumably because
there is no noise added in the learning process.
Privacy loss bounds for the same levels of accuracy can
be found in Table I. Similarly to the deep learning scenario,
the Bayesian accountant with its access to the distribution
of gradients has a remarkable advantage. It is also worth
mentioning, that for our methods we decreased δ to 10−5 on
Adult dataset, because the failure probability 10−3 originally
set in [40] is too high for almost 50k samples.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduce the notion of (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differential
privacy, a relaxation of (ε, δ)-differential privacy for sensitive
data that are drawn from an arbitrary (and unknown) distri-
bution µ(x). This relaxation is reasonable in many machine
learning scenarios where models and algorithms are designed
for and trained on specific data distributions (e.g. emails, face
images, ECGs, etc.). For example, it may be unjustified to try
hiding an absence of music records in a training set for ECG
analysis, because the probability of it appearing is actually
much smaller than δ.
We state and proof the advanced composition theorem for
Bayesian differential privacy that allows for efficient and tight
privacy accounting. Since the data distribution is unknown, we
design an estimator that overestimates the privacy loss with
high, controllable probability. Moreover, as the data sample is
finite, we employ the Bayesian parameter estimation approach
with the flat prior and the maximum entropy principle to avoid
underestimating probabilities of unseen examples. As a result,
our interpretation of δ is slightly different: not only is it the
probability of the privacy loss exceeding ε in the tails of its
distribution, but it also is the probability of underestimating
the privacy loss based on a finite sample of data.
Our evaluation confirms that Bayesian differential privacy
is highly beneficial in machine learning context where the
additional assumptions on data distribution are naturally sat-
isfied. First, it requires less noise to reach the same privacy
guarantees. Second, as a result, models train faster and can
reach higher accuracy. Third, it may be used along with
DP to achieve significantly lower ε values for most cases
while still maintaining the general DP guarantees. In our deep
learning experiments with convolutional neural networks and
variational inference experiments, εµ always remained well
below 1, allowing for much more meaningful bounds on the
potential attacker success probability.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Propositions
This section contains proofs of propositions.
Proposition 1. (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differential privacy implies
(εµ, δµ)-weak Bayesian differential privacy.
Proof. Let us define a set of outcomes for which the pri-
vacy loss variable exceeds the ε threshold: F (x′) = {w :
LA(w,D,D′) > ε}, and its compliment F c(x′).
Observe that L ≤ ε implies Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ Fc(x′)] ≤
eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S ∩ Fc(x′)], and therefore, Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩
Fc(x′) | x′] ≤ eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S∩Fc(x′) | x′], because A(D)
does not depend on x′, and A(D′) is already conditioned on
x′ through D′. Thus,
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] =
∫
Pr[A(D) ∈ S, x′] dx′ (14)
=
∫
Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ Fc(x′), x′] (15)
+ Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ F(x′), x′] dx′ (16)
=
∫
Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ Fc(x′)|x′]µ(x′) (17)
+ Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ F(x′), x′] dx′ (18)
≤
∫
eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S ∩ Fc(x′)|x′]µ(x′)
(19)
+ Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ F(x′), x′] dx′ (20)
≤
∫
eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S, x′] (21)
+ Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ F(x′), x′] dx′ (22)
≤ eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δµ, (23)
where in the first line we used marginalisation and the last
inequality is due to the fact that∫
Pr[A(D) ∈ S ∩ F(x′), x′] dx′ (24)
≤
∫
Pr[A(D) ∈ F(x′), x′] dx′ (25)
=
∫
µ(x′) Pr[A(D) ∈ F(x′) | x′] dx′ (26)
=
∫
µ(x′)
∫
w∈F(x′)
pA(w|D,x′) dw dx′ (27)
= Ex′ [Ew [1{L > ε}]] (28)
≤ δµ (29)
Proposition 2 (Post-processing). Let A : D → R be a
(εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differentially private algorithm. Then for
any arbitrary randomised data-independent mapping f : R →
R′, f(A(D)) is (εµ, δµ)-weak Bayesian differentially private.
Proof. By Proposition 1, (εµ, δµ)-BDP implies
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεµ Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δµ, (30)
for any set of outcomes S ⊂ R.
For a data-independent function f(·):
Pr [f(A(D)) ∈ T ] = Pr [A(D) ∈ S] (31)
≤ eεµ Pr [A(D′) ∈ S] + δµ, (32)
= eεµ Pr [f(A(D′)) ∈ T ] + δµ (33)
where S = f−1[T ], i.e. S is the preimage of T under f .
Proposition 3 (Basic composition). Let Ai : D → Ri, ∀i =
1..k, be a sequence of (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differentially private
algorithms. Then their combination, defined as A1:k : D →
R1 × . . .×Rk, is (kεµ, kδµ)-Bayesian differentially private.
Proof. Let us denote L = log p(w1,...,wk|D)p(w1,...,wk|D′) .
Also, let Li = log
p(wi|D,wi−1,...,w1)
p(wi|D′,wi−1,...,w1) . Then,
Pr [L ≥ kεµ] = Pr
[
k∑
i=1
Li ≥ kεµ
]
(34)
≤
k∑
i=1
Pr[Li ≥ εµ] (35)
≤
k∑
i=1
δµ (36)
≤ kδµ (37)
Proposition 4 (Group privacy). Let A : D → R be a (εµ, δµ)-
Bayesian differentially private algorithm. Then for all pairs of
datasets D,D′ ∈ D, differing in k data points x1, . . . , xk
s.t. xi ∼ µ(x) for i = 1..k, A(D) is (kεµ, kδµ)-Bayesian
differentially private.
Proof. Let us define a sequence of datasets Di, i = 1..k, s.t.
D = D0, D′ = Dk, and Di and Di−1 differ in a single
example. Then,
p(w|D)
p(w|D′) =
p(w|D0)p(w|D1) . . . p(w|Dk−1)
p(w|D1)p(w|D2) . . . p(w|Dk) (38)
Denote Li = log
p(w|Di−1)
p(w|Di) for i = 1..k.
Finally, applying the definition of (εµ, δµ)-Bayesian differ-
ential privacy,
Pr [L ≥ kεµ] = Pr
[
k∑
i=1
Li ≥ kεµ
]
(39)
≤
k∑
i=1
Pr[Li ≥ εµ] (40)
≤ kδµ (41)
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Let us restate the theorem:
Theorem 1 (Advanced Composition). Let a learning algo-
rithm run for T iterations. Denote by w(1) . . . w(T ) a sequence
of private learning outcomes obtained at iterations 1, . . . , T ,
and L(1:T ) the corresponding total privacy loss. Then,
E
[
eλL
(1:T )
]
=
T∏
t=1
Ex
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
,
where pt = p(w(t)|w(t−1), D), qt = p(w(t)|w(t−1), D′).
Proof. The proof closely follows [7].
First, we can write
L(1:T ) = log
p(w(1) . . . w(T ) | D)
p(w(1) . . . w(T ) | D′) (42)
= log
T∏
t=1
p(w(t) | w(t−1) . . . p(w(1), D)
p(w(t) | w(t−1) . . . p(w(1), D′) (43)
= log
T∏
t=1
p(w(t) | w(t−1), D)
p(w(t) | w(t−1), D′) (44)
=
T∑
t=1
L(t) (45)
Then,
E
[
eλL
(1:T )
]
= E
[
eλ
∑T
t=1 L
(t)
]
(46)
= E
[
e
λ
∑T
t=1 log
p(w(t) | w(t−1),D)
p(w(t) | w(t−1),D′)
]
(47)
= E
[
T∏
t=1
e
λ log
p(w(t) | w(t−1),D)
p(w(t) | w(t−1),D′)
]
(48)
=
T∏
t=1
E
[
e
λ log
p(w(t) | w(t−1),D)
p(w(t) | w(t−1),D′)
]
(49)
=
T∏
t=1
E
[
eλDλ+1(pt‖qt)
]
, (50)
where for (49), we additionally assume samples within D (as
well as D′) are exchangeable, because of taking expectation
over data. This assumption is natural in the applications we
consider: the order of data points should not matter and the
joint probability of any permutation of points should be the
same. Finally, (50) is by Eq. 7.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us restate the theorem:
Theorem 3. Estimator cˆt(λ) overestimates ct(λ) with proba-
bility 1− γ. That is,
Pr [cˆt(λ) < ct(λ)] ≤ γ.
Proof. First of all, we can drop the logarithm from our
consideration because of its monotonicity.
Now, assuming that samples eλDˆ
(t)
λ+1 have a common mean
and a common variance, and applying the maximum entropy
principle in combination with an uninformative (flat) prior, one
can show that the quantity
M(t)−E
[
e
λDˆ
(t)
λ+1
]
S(t)
√
m− 1 follows
the Student’s t-distribution with m−1 degrees of freedom [46].
Finally, we use the inverse of the Student’s t CDF to
find the value that this random variable would only exceed
with probability δ′. The result follows by simple arithmetical
operations.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Let us restate the theorem:
Theorem 4. Given the Gaussian noise mechanism with the
noise parameter σ and subsampling probability q, the privacy
cost for λ ∈ N at iteration t can be expressed as
ct(λ) = max{cLt (λ), cRt (λ)},
where
cLt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ+1,q)
[
e
k2−k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
,
cRt (λ) = logEx
[
Ek∼B(λ,q)
[
e
k2+k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]]
,
and B(λ, q) is the binomial distribution with λ experiments
and the probability of success q.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume D′ = D∪{x′}. For
brevity, let dt = ‖gt − g′t‖.
Let us first consider Dλ+1(p(w|D′)‖p(w|D)):
E
[(
p(w|D′)
p(w|D)
)λ+1]
= E
[(
(1− q)N (0, σ2) + qN (dt, σ2)
N (0, σ2)
)λ+1]
(51)
= E
[(
(1− q) + qN (dt, σ
2)
N (0, σ2)
)λ+1]
(52)
= E
[(
(1− q) + qe (w−dt)
2−w2
2σ2
)λ+1]
(53)
= E
[(
(1− q) + qe
2dw−d2t
2σ2
)λ+1]
(54)
= E
[
λ+1∑
k=0
(
λ+ 1
k
)
qk(1− q)λ+1−ke
2dtkw−kd2t
2σ2
]
(55)
=
λ+1∑
k=0
(
λ+ 1
k
)
qk(1− q)λ+1−kE
[
e
2dtkw−kd2t
2σ2
]
(56)
=
λ+1∑
k=0
(
λ+ 1
k
)
qk(1− q)λ+1−ke k
2−k
2σ2
d2t (57)
= Ek∼B(λ+1,q)
[
e
k2−k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]
, (58)
Here, in (55) we used the binomial expansion, in (56) the
fact that the factors in front of the exponent do not depend
on w, and in (57) the property Ew
[
exp(2aw/(2σ2))
]
=
exp(a2/(2σ2)) for w ∼ N (0, σ2). Plugging the above in
Eq. 9, we get the expression for cLt (λ).
Computing Dλ+1(p(w|D)‖p(w|D′)) is a little more chal-
lenging. Let us first change to Dλ(p(w|D)‖p(w|D′)), so that
the expectation is taken over N (0, σ2) (see Definition 4).
Then, we can bound it observing that f(x) = 1x is convex
for x > 0 and using the definition of convexity, and apply the
same steps as above:
E
[(
p(w|D)
p(w|D′)
)λ]
= E
[( N (0, σ2)
(1− q)N (0, σ2) + qN (dt, σ2)
)λ]
(59)
≤ E
[(
(1− q) + qe
d2t−2dw
2σ2
)λ]
(60)
= Ek∼B(λ,q)
[
e
k2+k
2σ2
‖gt−g′t‖2
]
(61)
In practice, we haven’t found any instance of
Dλ+1(p(w|D′)‖p(w|D)) < Dλ+1(p(w|D)‖p(w|D′)) when
the latter was computed using numerical integration, although
it may happen when using this theoretical upper bound.
